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SHOULD NON-FIDUCIARIES WHO KNOWINGLY PARTICIPATE IN
A FIDUCIARY BREACH BE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
UNDER ERISA?
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)1 largely to prevent pension plan administrators from mis-
using plan assets.2 Pension plans in the United States had over $300
billion in assets in 19743 when Congress enacted ERISA to protect "the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their benefi-
ciaries."'4 To prevent future abuse, Congress imposed strict fiduciary ob-
ligations on those exercising discretion over or having responsibility with
respect to the management, handling, or disposition of plan assets.'
Today, nearly twenty years after Congress enacted ERISA, plan ad-
ministrators continue to misuse plan assets.6 ERISA authorizes suits in
federal court by participants, beneficiaries, and the Secretary of Labor to
prevent and remedy breaches of plan fiduciaries' duties.7 However, the
remedies provided are not always sufficient because the plan cannot al-
l. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1988).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
3. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 332 (1981).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
5. 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams, Chairman, Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare) ("[Tihe legislation imposes strict fiduciary obligations on those who
have discretion or responsibility respecting the management, handling, or disposition of pension or
welfare plan assets. The objectives of these provisions are to make applicable the law of trusts;... to
establish uniform fiduciary standards to prevent transactions which dissipate or endanger plan as-
sets; and to provide effective remedies for breaches of trust."), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5186. See also Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 n.8 (1985) (review-
ing ERISA's legislative history).
6. See, eg., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 432 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3035 (noting that although the Department of Labor only has resources to
investigate 3000 plans each year out of the approximately 5.5 million plans that it oversees, the
Department finds fiduciary violations in one-fourth of the plans reviewed). See also Thornton v.
Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing fiduciary breaches as "a pattern which seems
distressingly prevalent today: the savings of working men and women are pilfered, embezzled,
parlayed, mismanaged and outright stolen by unscrupulous persons").
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). See infra notes 56 and 59 for the text of
§ 1132(a), (1). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988) (noting that ERISA provides "remedies, sanc-
tions, and ready access to the Federal courts" to prevent and remedy breaches by fiduciaries of their
duties). Courts have held that when beneficiaries or participants sue a plan fiduciary for breaching a
fiduciary duty, the proceeds collected from the judgment accrue to the plan. See, e.g., Russell, 473
U.S. at 140.
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ways collect the full amount of the judgment against the fiduciary. In
situations in which the plan cannot fully recover its losses from the fidu-
ciary and a non-fiduciary has knowingly aided in the breach of fiduciary
duties, plans have attempted to recover damages from the participating
non-fiduciaries' ERISA does not expressly make a non-fiduciary liable
for knowingly aiding a fiduciary in the breach of the fiduciary's duty.9
Consequently, when a non-fiduciary knowingly aided in a fiduciary's
breach, courts struggled within the confines of ERISA's plain language
as they attempted to implement Congress' intent to protect the interests
that participants and beneficiaries have in over $3.4 trillion worth of pen-
sion plan assets.10
The courts uniformly have agreed that ERISA does not expressly
grant participants and beneficiaries standing to bring suit against non-
fiduciaries for knowingly participating in a fiduciary's breach.1" Some
8. See, eg., Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding a non-fiduciary jointly and severally liable with the fiduciary for damages resulting from
knowing participation in the fiduciary's breach of duty); Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342
(6th Cir. 1988) (holding non-fiduciary liable); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, 829 F.2d 1209,
1220-21 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding non-fiduciary corporations liable for acting with the fiduciary to
cause prohibited investments of plan assets); Fink v. National Say. & Trust, 772 F.2d 951, 958 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (dictum) (approving non-fiduciary liability under ERISA); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d
1064, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding non-fiduciary liable); Dole v. Compton, 753 F. Supp. 563, 568
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding non-fiduciary liable for knowingly aiding in fiduciary breach); Foltz v. U.S.
News & World Report, 627 F. Supp. 1143, 1168 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding liable non-fiduciary who
participated in fiduciary breach of trust); Brock v. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563, 569 (D.N.J. 1986)
(finding non-fiduciaries potentially liable for aiding in breach); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp.
390, 411 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (holding non-fiduciary liable for knowingly participating in breach of
fiduciary duty); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 641-42 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(holding non-fiduciaries liable for knowingly participating in a fiduciary's breach). But see Useden v.
Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1565 (11th Cir. 1991), cerL denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3843 (U.S. June 7, 1993)
(No. 91-1944) (declining to impose liability on non-fiduciaries for acting in concert with fiduciaries
who breached their fiduciary duties); Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1988) (declining to
impose liability on a lawyer as a non-fiduciary for unjustly profiting from plan fiduciary's failure to
disclose the payment from plan assets of unearned legal fees to the attorney).
9. Diduck, 974 F.2d at 279-80. The Second Circuit observed that "[u]nder its plain terms
ERISA actions for breach of fiduciary duties lie only against the fiduciary who breaches such a duty,
§ 409, a co-fiduciary who knowingly participates in or conceals an act or omission of another fiduci-
ary, § 405, or in actions by the Secretary of Labor, against a third person [a non-fiduciary] who
knowingly participates in a breach of fiduciary responsibility, § 502()(1)." Id.
10. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TiE
UNrrED STATES 363 (1992). The pension plan asset level is for 1991. Although the pension plan
asset level for 1974, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, is from the same government source,
the government utilized different base years for the two computations. Consequently, for exact com-
parisons, the 1991 figure should be multiplied by a dollar deflator.
11. Because courts find no such express authority, most plaintiffs allege at least three alterna-
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courts had fashioned a federal common law cause of action against non-
fiduciaries for knowingly aiding in the breach of fiduciary duty.2 Other
courts had declined to hold non-fiduciaries liable because ERISA's plain
language does not provide for actions by beneficiaries and participants
against non-fiduciaries.1 3 The Supreme Court's decision in Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates 4 resolved the conflict among the circuits. In Mertens,
the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision that non-fiduciaries who
knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach are not liable for damages. 15
This Note considers whether non-fiduciaries who knowingly aid a fidu-
ciary in the breach of his duties should be liable for damages under
ERISA. Part I discusses the law of trusts, ERISA, and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of ERISA's relationship to the common law of
trusts. 6 Part II evaluates the analysis of the circuit courts prior to the
Mertens decision.' 7 Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in
Mertens. 8 Part IV proposes a statutory amendment that would make
non-fiduciaries jointly and severally liable for plan losses resulting from
knowing participation in a fiduciary breach. 9
tive theories of liability by characterizing those who knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach as
fiduciaries, parties in interest, or non-fiduciaries. See, e.g., Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F. 2d 868, 870-71,
873 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that participants alleged attorney was liable alternatively as a fiduciary, a
party-in-interest, or a non-fiduciary). A discussion of how to distinguish between the three different
characterizations is beyond the scope of this Note.
12. See, eg., Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1992);
Pappas v. Buck Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 531, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1991); Whitfield v. Lindemann,
853 F.2d 1298, 1303 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989); Brock v. Hendershott, 840
F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d
Cir. 1987); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Painters of Philadel-
phia District Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146, 1153 n.9 (3d Cir.
1989) (noting that because the beneficiaries did not allege that the non-fiduciary had knowingly
participated in the fiduciary's breach, they could not recover); Fink v. National Say. & Trust, 772
F.2d 951, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dictum) (approving non-fiduciary liability under ERISA).
13. See, eg., Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 948 F.2d 607, 612 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
113 S.Ct. 49 (1992); Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1565 (11th Cir. 1991), petition for cert filed,
60 U.S.L.W. 3843 (U.S. June 1, 1992) (No. 91-1944); Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir.
1988).
14. 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993). See infra notes 156-224 and accompanying text.
15. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2072.
16. See infra notes 20-90 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 91-155 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 156-224 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 225-40 and accompanying text.
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I. THE LAW OF TRUSTS, ERISA, AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION
Congress enacted ERISA to stop trustees from misusing plan assets
through self-dealing, imprudent investing, and misappropriation--con-
duct which historically had prevented many employee benefit plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries from receiving their benefits.2 ° Congress
directed the federal judiciary to develop federal common law21 governing
ERISA-regulated plans and protecting the interests of plan participants
and beneficiaries in a manner consistent with both the traditional law of
trusts and the "special nature and purposes of employee benefit plans."'22
A. The Law of Trusts
Under common law, a trustee has a duty of loyalty that requires the
trustee to act in good faith and solely in the beneficiary's interest.23 In
fulfilling the duty of loyalty, the trustee must exercise the care and skill
of a reasonably prudent person and whatever additional skill the trustee
may actually possess. 24 Courts require strict compliance with the duty of
loyalty because of the fiduciary's confidence in the trustee and the fiduci-
ary relationship.25
20. See 120 CONG. REc. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams, Chairman, Senate Commit-
tee on Labor and Public Welfare) (observing that state and federal laws before ERISA were ineffec-
tive in preventing or correcting the abuse of employee benefit plans), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5177, 5186.
21. See 120 CONG. REc. 29,941 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("[A] body of Federal substan-
tive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving the rights and obligations under
private welfare and pension plans."). See also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)
(holding that courts are to develop a "federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-
regulated plans").
22. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4650 [hereinafter House Report]; S.R. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1973), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865. Congress recognized that the trusts involved in employee benefit
plans were different from typical testamentary and inter vivos trusts "both in purpose and in nature"
because employee benefit plans are designed for large numbers of people. House Report, supra, at
4650. Therefore, Congress instructed courts to bear in mind the nature of employee benefit plans
when developing federal common law. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5083.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
24. Id. § 174.
25. See, eg., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). In Meinhard, former Judge
Cardozo described the fiduciary duty of complete, undivided loyalty as follows:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior .... Uncompromising rigidity
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A trust beneficiary reasonably expects third persons not to participate
knowingly in a fiduciary's breach.26 Third persons have a corresponding
duty not to participate knowingly in a fiduciary's breach and will be lia-
ble to the beneficiary for such conduct.27 The common law's rationale
for imposing liability on non-fiduciaries who knowingly aid a fiduciary's
breach is that beneficiaries may not be able to obtain full relief unless
courts can impose liability on the non-fiduciary.28
The common law only holds a non-fiduciary liable for knowingly par-
ticipating in the fiduciary's breach of duty.29 A beneficiary must prove
two elements to prevail in a suit against a non-fiduciary. 30 First, the ben-
eficiary must show that the non-fiduciary's act or omission furthered or
completed the fiduciary's breach of duty.31 Second, the beneficiary must
prove that the non-fiduciary had actual or constructive knowledge that
the transaction was a breach of the fiduciary's duty.32 If the beneficiary
successfully proves that the third party knowingly participated in the fi-
duciary's breach, the third party is jointly and severally liable with the
fiduciary to the beneficiary for the damage done to the trust res.33
B. ER ISA
Title I of ERISA protects employee benefit rights by imposing on fidu-
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undi-
vided loyalty....
Id. at 546. Although Meinhard is often cited to explain the duty of loyalty owed by a trustee as a
fiduciary, the case actually involved a fiduciary relationship between two joint venturers rather than
between a trustee and a beneficiary.
26. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 901 (2d ed. 1982)
(stating that "the beneficiary as equitable owner of the trust res has the right that third persons shall
not knowingly join with the trustee in a breach of trust").
27. Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 327 (1879) ("The law exacts the most perfect good faith from
all parties dealing with a trustee respecting trust property .... The doctrine pervades the whole law
of trusts."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326 (1959) ("A third person who, although not
a transferee of trust property, has notice that the trustee is committing a breach of trust and partici-
pates therein is liable to the beneficiary for any loss caused by the breach of trust.").
28. For example, if the fiduciary does not have sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment, the
beneficiary is left without relief. See, eg., Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209,
1220-21 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing the necessity of imposing liability on non-fiduciaries under
ERISA to prevent a fiduciary from shifting fiduciary obligations to one legal entity with no assets
while channeling profits from self-dealing to a separate legal entity under the fiduciary's control).
29. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 26, § 901.
30. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 26, § 901.
31. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 26, § 901.
32. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 26, § 901. See also Smith, 101 U.S. at 325-26 (holding
that constructive knowledge was sufficient to make third party liable for participation in the breach).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 27, § 326.
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ciaries reporting and disclosure standards, 34 minimum participation and
vesting standards, 35 funding standards, 36 and strict fiduciary standards.37
The statute also authorizes criminal and civil penalties for violations of
the Act.38  Through ERISA's fiduciary standards, Congress intended to
codify traditional trust law principles and apply them to employee benefit
plans.39 Recognizing the increasingly interstate nature of employee bene-
fit plans, Congress also intended to bring uniformity to an area in which
states had applied different rules of decision to the same fact pattems.40
Congress increased the impact of ERISA's new, uniform fiduciary provi-
sions by broadly preempting "any and all State laws" that "relate to" a
plan regulated by ERISA41 and by granting federal courts exclusive juris-
diction over virtually all disputes involving employee benefit plans.42
Section 3(21)(A) of ERISA defines a fiduciary as a person who exer-
cises any discretionary authority or control over the management of a
benefit plan, a plan's administration, or the disposition of a plan's assets,
or as a person who renders investment advice for compensation.43 Sec-
tion 404(a) of ERISA imposes the common law duty of loyalty on em-
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1988).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1988).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1988).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1988).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145 (1988).
39. House Report, supra note 22, at 4649.
40. House Report, supra note 22, at 4650.
41. Section 514(a) of ERISA provides as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this
title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
42. Section 502(e) of ERISA provides for federal jurisdiction, proper venue, and service of
process:
(1) Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the district courts of the
United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter
brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. State courts of com-
petent jurisdiction and district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdic-
tion of actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1988). Section 502(a)(1)(B) allows participants and beneficiaries to bring civil
suits concerning individual benefits and rights. See infra note 59.
43. Section 3(21)(A) of ERISA provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with respect to
a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting man-
agement or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary au-
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ployee benefit plan fiduciaries, requiring fiduciaries to perform their
duties solely in the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries for the
purpose of providing benefits and defraying administrative expenses.'
Section 404(a) also applies a "prudent man" rule to fiduciary conduct
and requires fiduciaries to diversify investments to minimize the risk of
large losses.45
Congress enacted section 406 of ERISA which prohibits transactions
with parties in interest because it was concerned that fiduciaries were
engaging in self-dealing and misappropriating plan funds.4 6 Section
3(14) defines nine categories of people who are "parties in interest" to
employee benefit plans.47 The list includes the benefit plan's fiduciaries,
counsel and employees, persons providing services to the plan, employers
whose employees are covered by the plan, and employee organizations
whose members are covered by the plan.48  Many non-fiduciaries who
knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach are parties in interest.
ERISA's plain language provides remedies for breach of fiduciary du-
thority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. Such term in-
cludes any person designated under section 1 105(c)(1)(B) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988). The exception contained in subparagraph (B) states that invest-
ments in securities by investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940
(15 U.S.C. § 80a-l) do not by themselves make the investment company a fiduciary. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(B) (1988). Section 1105(c)(I)(B) allows the fiduciary to designate persons other than
named fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary responsibilities under the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1)(B)
(1988).
44. Section 404(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses,
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such
documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter and sub-
chapter III of this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
45. Id.
46. Subsection (a) of section 406 of ERISA prohibits transactions between the plan and a party
in interest, subsection (b) forbids transactions between the plan and a fiduciary, and subsection (c)
prevents a party in interest from transferring real or personal property to the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1106
(1988).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1988).
48. Id.
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ties against a fiduciary who breaches a duty under section 40941 and
against a co-fiduciary who knowingly participates in or conceals another
fiduciary's act or omission under section 405.50 Section 409 of ERISA
makes fiduciaries personally liable for plan losses resulting from their
breach and requires the fiduciary to restore to the plan any profits made
through the use of plan assets.51 It also authorizes courts to grant other
appropriate equitable or remedial relief.52 In certain instances, section
405 of ERISA makes a fiduciary liable for a co-fiduciary's breach with
respect to the same plan.53 A party's liability for a breach of fiduciary
duty under sections 409 and 405 depends on whether or not that party is
a fiduciary under section 3(21). Consequently, most plaintiffs attempt to
characterize as fiduciaries those who take part in a fiduciary breach.54
Most plaintiffs will also allege alternatively that if some parties partici-
pating in the breach did not exercise enough discretionary control or re-
sponsibility to be deemed fiduciaries, the parties should be liable as non-
fiduciaries for knowingly participating in the fiduciary's breach.55
Congress amended ERISA in 1989, adding section 502(l), which con-
tains ERISA's only explicit provision for non-fiduciary liability.56 Sec-
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988). See infra note 50.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1988), A co-fiduciary is one who meets the definition of fiduciary in
section 3(21). Because a plan usually has multiple fiduciaries, section 405 sets forth the circum-
stances under which one fiduciary will be liable for a breach committed by another one of the plan's
fiduciaries. See infra note 53.
51. Section 409(a) of ERISA provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the respon-
sibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be person-
ally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made
through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equita-
ble or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such
fiduciary.
29 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (1988).
52. Id.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1988). A co-fiduciary is liable for another fiduciary's breach in three
situations. First, if the co-fiduciary knowingly participates in the breach or attempts to conceal
another fiduciary's act or omission, the co-fiduciary is liable. Id. § 1105(a)(1). Second, if the co-
fiduciary fails to fulfill fiduciary duties and this failure enables another fiduciary to breach a duty, the
co-fiduciary is also liable. Id. § 1105(a)(2). Finally, a co-fiduciary is liable if the co-fiduciary has
knowledge of another fiduciary's breach and does not make reasonable efforts under the circum-
stances to remedy the breach. Id. § 1105(a)(3).
54. See, e.g., Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1565 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W.
3843 (U.S. June 7, 1993) (No. 91-1944); Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1988).
55. See, eg., Useden, 947 F.2d at 1579; Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873.
56. Originally, ERISA did not contain any express provisions for non-fiduciary liability, Sec-
tion 502(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l) (Supp. III 1991), was added by an amendment in the 1989
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tion 502(/)(1) allows the Secretary of Labor to assess a civil penalty
against a non-fiduciary who knowingly participates in a fiduciary
breach.57 The penalty may equal twenty percent of a judgment against a
fiduciary or non-fiduciary who knowingly participated in the fiduciary's
breach.58
Section 502(a) of ERISA gives plan beneficiaries and participants
standing to bring civil actions in federal court.59 Subsection 502(a)(2)
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 2101, 103 Stat. 2123 (1989). Section
502(l) provides as follows:
(1) In the case of-
(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other violation of) part 4 of this
subtitle by a fiduciary, or
(B) any knowing participation in such a breach or violation by any other person, the
Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary or other person in an amount
equal to 20 percent of the applicable recovery amount.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "applicable recovery amount" means any
amount which is recovered from a fiduciary or other person with respect to a breach or
violation described in paragraph (1)--
(A) pursuant to any settlement agreement with the Secretary, or
(B) ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other person to a plan or its
participants and beneficiaries in a judicial proceeding instituted by the Secretary under
subsection (a)(2) or (a)(5) of this section.
(3) The Secretary may, in the Secretary's sole discretion, waive or reduce the penalty
under paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines in writing that-
(A) the fiduciary or other person acted reasonably and in good faith, or
(B) it is reasonable to expect that the fiduciary or other person will not be able to restore
all losses to the plan without severe financial hardship unless such waiver or reduction is
granted.
(4) The penalty imposed on a fiduciary or other person under this subsection with respect
to any transaction shall be reduced by the amount of any penalty or tax imposed on such
fiduciary or other person with respect to such transaction under subsection (i) of this sec-
tion and section 4975 of Title 26.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(/) (Supp. III 1991).
57. Id. § 1132(1)(1).
58. Id.
59. Section 502(a) of ERISA provides that
A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant or beneficiary -
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan;
(2) by the Secretary [of Labor], or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which vio-
lates any provision of this subehapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of
a violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the Secretary (A) to
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allows a participant or beneficiary to bring civil suit for "appropriate re-
lief" under section 409.0 Subsection 502(a)(3) is a catch-all provision6
that allows a participant or beneficiary to bring suit to enjoin any act or
practice that violates any provision of subchapter I of ERISA or that
violates the benefit plan's terms.62 Subsection 502(a)(3) also authorizes
the court to grant beneficiaries and participants "other appropriate equi-
table relief."63 The equitable relief may include an injunction to prevent
a violation of fiduciary duty, a constructive trust, created to preserve plan
assets, or removal of a fiduciary."
C. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of ERISA's Relationship to the
Law of Trusts
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,65 the Supreme Court
limited fiduciary liability under ERISA to actions brought for the plan's
benefit.66 In Russell, an employee benefit plan beneficiary brought suit
under section 502(a) against a plan fiduciary for the untimely processing
of benefit claims.6 7 The beneficiary sought extracontractual damages as
the appropriate section 409(a) relief that section 502(a)(2) grants to par-
ticipants and beneficiaries in suits against fiduciaries.6" The Supreme
enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provi-
sion of this subchapter; or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (c)(2) or (i) or (1) of this
section.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1988). The "appropriate relief" under § 409 may include the recov-
ery of damages, but the plain language of § 409 only applies to fiduciaries. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The language of § 1132(a)(5) provides the
same remedies in suits brought by the Secretary of Labor that § 1132(a)(3) provides in suits brought
by participants or beneficiaries. See supra note 59.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
63. Id.
64. S. REP. No. 383, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 105-06 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4989.
65. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
66. Id. at 144. The Court found that any recovery for a violation of section 409(a) in a suit
brought by a participant or beneficiary against a fiduciary inures to the benefit of the plan as a whole.
Id. at 140. The Court cited the language of section 409(a), recognizing that the fiduciary relation-
ship is "with respect to a plan" and that the potential personal liability a fiduciary faces is the
responsibility "to make good to such plan any losses to the plan.., and to restore to such plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan." Id. at 139.
67. Id. at 137.
68. Id. at 138.
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Court held that a fiduciary is not personally liable to a plan participant or
beneficiary for extracontractual damages caused by improper or delin-
quent processing of benefit claims.69
The plan beneficiary in Russell made two arguments for extracontrac-
tual damages. The beneficiary argued that section 409(a) expressly pro-
vides for extracontractual damages, 7 and asserted, alternatively, that the
Court should imply a private right of action to recover such damages.7 2
The Court rejected the beneficiary's first argument by noting that all of
the remedies in section 409(a) provide relief to the plan itself, not to an
individual beneficiary, and that nothing in the text of section 409(a) sup-
ports an award of extracontractual damages to an individual
beneficiary.73
The Court then applied the four-factor analysis from Cort v. Ash 74 to
the beneficiary's argument that a cause of action for extracontractual
damages should be implied even if it is not expressly authorized by
ERISA.75
Under the Cort analysis, the judiciary must make four inquiries in or-
der to decide whether or not a private remedy exists in a statute that does
not expressly provide one.76 First, is the plaintiff a member of "the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted?' 77 Second, is there
any explicit or implicit indication of congressional intent to create or
deny the remedy requested?78 Third, is implying the requested remedy
consistent with the purposes underlying the legislative scheme?79 Fi-
nally, is the cause of action one that is traditionally relegated to state law,
such that an implied cause of action based solely on federal law would be
69. Id. at 144.
70. Russell, 473 U.S. at 138.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 144. The Court observed that the beneficiary relied entirely on § 409(a) and ex-
pressly disclaimed any reliance on § 502(a)(3), which allows a beneficiary to "obtain other appropri-
ate equitable relief." Id. at 139 n.5. Consequently, the Court did not consider whether any other
provision might authorize recovery of extracontractual damages. Id. Similarly, the Court did not
decide whether § 409(a) authorizes recovery of such damages from a fiduciary by a plan. Id. at 144
n.12.
74. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
75. Russell, 473 U.S. at 145.
76. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
77. Id. (quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
78. Cori, 422 U.S. at 78.
79. Id.
1993]
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inappropriate?80
The Court acknowledged that the first and fourth factors supported
the beneficiary's claim because the beneficiary was a member of the class
for whose benefit ERISA was enacted and also because ERISA broadly
preempted state law, thus removing any state law barrier to implying a
remedy.81 However, the Court found that the second and third factors,
legislative intent and consistency with ERISA's statutory scheme, failed
to support the beneficiary's claim for an implied remedy of extracontrac-
tual damages.8 2 The Court stated that the six civil enforcement provi-
sions in section 502(a) and the accompanying legislative history strongly
suggest that Congress did not inadvertently omit other remedies.8" The
Court explained that congressional intent is "the essential predicate for
implication of a private remedy"84 and without an inference of congres-
sional intent, the Cort inquiry ends.85 Therefore, the Court declined to
imply a private cause of action.86
However, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,87 the Court ex-
pressly authorized courts to develop a federal common law under ERISA
that would rely on traditional principles of trust law.88 In Firestone, the
Court established the proper standard for judicial review of a partici-
pant's suit challenging a denial of benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B).89
The Court recognized that ERISA's language parallels the language of
traditional trust law in many places and that the legislative history be-
hind ERISA's fiduciary provisions supports the codification and applica-
80. Id.
81. Russell, 473 U.S. at 145.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 145-46.
84. Id. (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981)).
85. Russell, 473 U.S. at 145-48.
86. Id. at 148.
87. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
88. Id. at 110.
89. Id. at 105. In Firestone, the Court addressed the proper standard for judicial review of
benefit determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators under ERISA. Id. It also refined the
definition of the term "participant" in section 2(7) of ERISA. Id. at 105. The Court held that "a
denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless
the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility
for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Id. at 115. The Court found that the term
"participant" refers either to employees who are covered or reasonably expect to be covered by the
plan, or to former employees whose benefits have vested or who reasonably expect to return to
employment covered by the plan. Id. at 117.
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tion of traditional trust principles to employee benefit plans.'
The Supreme Court's opinions in Russell and Firestone are primary
sources of guidance for lower courts that must construe ERISA's statu-
tory language and create federal common law under ERISA to fill the
statutory interstices. However, the Russell court followed ERISA's plain
language, refusing to imply a private cause of action that would be analo-
gous to the common law, while the court in Firestone incorporated a
common-law standard. The two different approaches raise questions
about how much of the law of trusts should be read into ERISA and into
the federal common law developing under the statute.
II. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS PRIOR TO MERTENS
A. Courts Holding Non-Fiduciaries Liable
Courts that held non-fiduciaries liable for knowingly participating in a
fiduciary's breach generally advanced two theories of liability. The first
theory held the non-fiduciary liable under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA,
which authorizes the court to provide "other" equitable relief for viola-
tion of a fiduciary's duties.91 Under the second theory, courts developed
federal common law to fill ERISA's interstices, holding the non-fiduciary
liable for knowingly participating in the fiduciary's breach.92
Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank93 was the progenitor of decisions
holding that plan participants and beneficiaries may sue non-fiduciaries
in federal court for knowingly participating in a fiduciary's breach. The
90. Id. at 110. See supra notes 22, 39 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text. Section 502(a)(3) authorizes participant
and beneficiary suits. The Secretary of Labor had advanced the same theory for suits brought under
§ 502(a)(5). See, eg., Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp 629, 641-42 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(finding liability under §§ 502(aX3) and (a)(5)).
92. See infra notes 115-30 and accompanying text. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit had ad-
vanced a third theory which held a non-fiduciary liable for conspiring with a fiduciary to breach the
duties imposed by ERISA. See, e.g., Pappas v. Buck Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 531, 541 (7th Cir.
1991); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982); Fremont v. McGraw-Edison Co.,
606 F.2d 752, 759 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980). Because these plaintiffs were
not able to prove the elements of a conspiracy, the non-fiduciaries were not held liable. However, the
Seventh Circuit had affirmed that in a civil action against a trustee, third parties who had aided or
conspired with the trustee in a breach of fiduciary duty may have been liable "to the extent that they
[had] profited form the breach." Thornton, 692 F.2d at 1078. Because non-fiduciaries were only
liable to the extent of their profits from a breach and were not jointly and severally liable, the remedy
may have been inadequate. If the non-fiduciaries' profits were less then the difference between the
plan's loss and the amount the fiduciary could have contributed toward the judgment, the plan
would not have been fully compensated for its loss.
93. 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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Freund court held the non-fiduciaries jointly and severally liable with the
fiduciaries under sections 409(a) and 502(a)(3) for damages to the plan
resulting from the breach. 94
In Freund, the employee benefit plan's trustees and their relatives were
the controlling shareholders in several companies whose employees were
covered by the plan.95 The trustees permitted virtually all of the plan's
assets to be loaned back to the sponsoring companies in exchange for
unsecured promissory notes.9 6 By allowing the plan assets to be loaned
back, the trustees violated their duty of prudence under section
404(a)(1)(B) and failed to diversify the plan's investments to minimize
the risk of large losses as required by section 404(a)(1)(C). 97 Because the
sponsoring companies were parties in interest under section 3(14)(C),98
the loans were also prohibited transactions with parties in interest 99 in
violation of section 406(a). The trustees and their relatives subsequently
sold the sponsoring companies. Under the new owner, the sponsoring
companies went bankrupt, causing the plan's unsecured notes to decrease
in value by over $450,000.1'
The court reasoned that although only fiduciaries can breach ERISA's
fiduciary standards, both fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries who knowingly
participate in the fiduciaries' breach may be held liable for damages. 0 1
Therefore, the court imposed liability not only on the trustees for their
breach of fiduciary duty under section 409(a), 102 but also on the relatives,
who were non-fiduciaries under ERISA.' °3 Recognizing that Congress
intended to apply traditional trust law to ERISA, the court cited the
common law principle that non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate in
a fiduciary's breach, either directly or through an agent, are liable in an
action brought by the beneficiary.'I The court stated that a non-fiduci-
ary will be liable under common law if the non-fiduciary commits any act
or omission which furthers or completes the fiduciary's breach and the
94. Id. at 644.
95. Id. at 639.
96. Id. at 636.
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
99. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 637-38.
100. Id. at 642-44.
101. Id. at 641.
102. Id. at 643.
103. Id. at 641-42. The court held the relatives liable under section 502(a)(3), which authorizes
the court to grant "other appropriate equitable relief." Id. at 641.
104. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 642. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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non-fiduciary has actual or constructive knowledge that the transaction
was a breach of trust.1"5 The court found that the relatives participated
in the loans that breached the trust and that the relatives had actual
knowledge that the transaction was a breach of trust.10 6 Consequently,
the court held the relatives jointly and severally liable with the trustees
for the plan's losses.' 7 Since Freund, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Sev-
enth Circuits adopted the Freund court's analysis of non-fiduciary
liability.10 8
After Freund was decided, Congress amended ERISA 109 by adding
section 502(l), which allows the Secretary of Labor to assess penalties
equal to twenty percent of the recovery from a fiduciary or a non-fiduci-
ary against any party that knowingly participates in a fiduciary's
breach." 0 Also, as noted, the Supreme Court in Russell... and Fire-
stone 112 further defined the applicability of trust law principles to ER-
ISA. In Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc. ,113 the Second
Circuit considered the Freund court's analysis in light of section 502(l)
and Russell. 114
In Diduck, the Second Circuit acknowledged that ERISA does not
expressly give plan participants and beneficiaries a right of action against
non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach.' 5
105. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 642. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
106. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 642. Although the court found that the relatives had actual knowl-
edge that the transaction was a breach of trust, the court expressly recognized constructive knowl-
edge as a sufficient basis for liability. Id. Other courts have also held that constructive knowledge is
a basis for non-fiduciary liability. See, eg., Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988).
107. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 644.
108. See, e.g., Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1992);
Pappas v. Buck Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 531, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1991); Whitfield v. Lindemann,
853 F.2d 1298, 1303 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989); Brock v. Hendershott, 840
F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d
Cir. 1987); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Painters of Philadel-
phia District Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146, 1153 n.9 (3d Cir.
1989) (noting that the beneficiaries could not recover because they did not allege that the non-
fiduciary had knowingly participated in the fiduciary's breach); Fink v. National Say. & Trust, 772
F.2d 951, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dictum) (approving non-fiduciary liability under ERISA).
109. The amendment was added in the 1989 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
101-239, § 2101, 103 Stat. 2123, (1989) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)(1) (Supp. III 1991)).
110. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 65-86 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
113. 974 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1992).
114. Id. at 279-81.
115. Id. at 279-80.
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Next, the court decided that the legislative history behind section 502(l)
indicated that the judiciary should continue to recognize a federal com-
mon law action under ERISA against non-fiduciaries who knowingly
participate in a breach of fiduciary duty. 116 To support its decision, the
court cited language in the 1989 Budget Reconciliation Act Conference
Report which directed courts to create legal and equitable remedies to
protect participants and beneficiaries and to deter violations of the
law.117 Prior to the amendment, courts had created a cause of action
under ERISA and held non-fiduciaries who knowingly participated in a
fiduciary's breach liable through an analogy to the law of trusts. In
Diduck, the Second Circuit read the legislative history of section 502(l)
as a mandate to continue filling the statute's interstices by incorporating
traditional trust law into the federal common law.'18 The Second Circuit
noted that Russell limited courts' authority to fashion remedies, but con-
cluded that applying Russell's limiting language to the circumstances at
hand would defeat the congressional mandate that courts should shape
relief based on trust law principles when necessary to protect plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries.' 19
The Diduck court then focused on whether a federal common law
cause of action under ERISA is necessary to protect plan participants
and beneficiaries and to promote uniformity. The court also considered
whether recognizing a federal common-law cause of action would be con-
sistent with ERISA's scheme and further the Act's purposes. 120
The Second Circuit began by discussing the scope of ERISA's pre-
emption of state-law actions under section 514(a).' 2 ' The court reasoned
that ERISA most likely preempts any state-law cause of action against a
non-fiduciary who knowingly participates in a fiduciary's breach because
ERISA supersedes any and all state laws that "relate to" ERISA-regu-
lated employee benefit plans 2 and because Congress expected courts to
develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-
116. Id. at 280-81.
117. Diduck, 974 F.2d at 280. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 433 (1989),
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3036 ("It remains the intent of Congress that the courts use
their power of [sic] fashion legal and equitable remedies that not only protect participants and benefi-
ciaries but deter violations of the law as well.").
118. Diduck, 974 F.2d at 280.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 280-81.
122. Id. at 280. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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regulated plans.1 2 3 Although Congress has the power to preempt state-
law remedies without providing a corresponding federal remedy,124 it is
not likely that Congress intended to leave plan participants and benefi-
ciaries without a remedy because ERISA's primary purpose was to pro-
tect the rights of plan participants and beneficiaries.1 2 5 If Congress did
not preempt state-law actions against non-fiduciaries, the congressional
goal of uniformity in the laws governing employee benefit plans would be
frustrated because the conduct and liability of non-fiduciaries would be
determined by state law, while the conduct and liability of the fiduciary
would be determined by federal law. 26 If Congress did preempt state-
law actions by enacting section 502(a)(3), which provides for other ap-
propriate equitable relief, Congress would have impeded its own goal of
protecting the rights of plan participants and beneficiaries. The Second
Circuit noted that an award of damages is necessary to protect the plan,
however non-fiduciaries who knowingly participated in a fiduciary
breach would not be liable for damages in state court due to preemption
or in federal court due to section 502(a)(3)'s equitable relief limitation. 127
The Diduck court next considered whether creating a federal com-
mon-law cause of action for damages would be consistent with ERISA
and its remedial objectives.1 28 The court decided that allowing partici-
pants and beneficiaries to bring a cause of action for damages to protect
the plan, rather than the extracontractual damages sought by the partici-
pant in Russell would further ERISA's goals of protecting the rights of
participants and beneficiaries and promoting uniformity in the law gov-
123. Diduck, 974 F.2d at 280-81. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
124. Diduck, 974 F.2d at 281 (citing Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1470 (11th Cir.
1986), cerL denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987)).
125. See supra notes 4-5, 20-22 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit acknowledged the
analysis of certain courts that held that because preemption ultimately depends upon congressional
purpose, if a federal common-law cause of action does not exist under ERISA, Congress could not
have intended to preempt the corresponding state-law cause of action. Diduck, 974 F.2d at 281
(citing Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1093 (1990); Coleman v. General Elec. Co., 643 F. Supp. 1229, 1233-34 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), afl'd
mem., 822 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1987); Capital Mercury Shirt Corp. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.,
749 F. Supp. 926, 933-34 (W.D. Ark. 1990); Munoz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 633 F. Supp.
564, 571 (D. Colo. 1986)). The critical problem with the reasoning in these cases is that it is unlikely
that Congress would have purposefully preempted the state-law cause of action and not provided a
corresponding federal cause of action. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
126. Diduck, 974 F.2d at 281 (quoting Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp.
1143, 1176 (D.D.C. 1986)).
127. Id. at 281.
128. Id.
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erning employee benefit plans.' 2 9 Consequently, the Second Circuit held
that under ERISA, non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate in an ER-
ISA fiduciary's breach of duty are jointly and severally liable with the
fiduciary for the resulting damages. 130
B. Courts Not Holding Non-Fiduciaries Liable
In Nieto v. Ecker,131' the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split by hold-
ing that non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach
are not liable under ERISA.132 In Nieto, plan participants sued a multi-
employer plan, its trustees, and an attorney retained by the trustees to
collect delinquent contributions from employers who owed the plan. 133
The participants contended that the attorney should be liable as a fiduci-
ary under section 409(a), or alternatively, as a non-fiduciary who know-
ingly participated in a fiduciary breach under section 409(a). 134
Upon deciding that the attorney was not a fiduciary, the court inquired
whether the attorney should be held liable as a non-fiduciary who know-
ingly participated in the fiduciary's breach.' 35 The Ninth Circuit ob-
served that the plain and unambiguous language of section 409(a) proved
that the section only applied to fiduciaries. 36 Consequently, the court
considered the section's legislative history irrelevant. 137
The Ninth Circuit then focused on the Freund court's analysis 138 and
criticized it on two grounds. First, the Nieto court asserted that the leg-
129. Id.
130. Id at 281. The court stated that the "well-settled" elements of the cause of action for
knowingly participating in a fiduciary's breach are "1) breach by a fiduciary of a duty owed to the
plaintiff, 2) defendant's knowing participation in the breach, and 3) damages." Id. at 281-82. See
supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text for the elements of the common-law cause of action.
131. 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988).
132. Id. at 871. See also id. at 874-75 (Wiggins, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority opinion
for rejecting the analysis of the Freund line of cases and creating "a needless circuit conflict"). For a
further analysis of Nieto, see generally, Kevin B. Bogucki et al., Case Comment, ERISA-Nieto v.
Ecker: The Propriety of Non-Fiduciary Liability Under Section 409, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271
(1989); Julianne J. Knox, Comment, Nieto v. Ecker: Incorporation of Non-Fiduciary Liability Under
ERISA, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1303 (1989).
133. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 870. The participants alleged that the attorney "had repeatedly failed to
prosecute lawsuits to collect the delinquent contributions" and had collected fees for services never
rendered. Id.
134. Id. at 870-71.
135. Id. at 871-73.
136. Id. at 871.
137. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 872 n.2.
138. See supra notes 93-107 for a discussion of the Freund decision.
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islative history cited in Freund was too ambiguous to justify a cause of
action not explicitly within the jurisdiction of federal courts. 139 Second,
the Ninth Circuit argued that the Freund court mistakenly read the legis-
lative history as authorizing courts to incorporate the entire body of
traditional trust law into ERISA. Instead, the Ninth Circuit said the
legislative history allowed courts to apply traditional trust law principles
in adjudicating claims expressly authorized by ERISA. 14°
The court in Nieto contended that Russell supported its interpretation
of ERISA's remedial provisions. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the
Supreme Court in Russell declined to imply a private cause of action
against a fiduciary for extracontractual damages because Congress had
already created a carefully integrated remedial scheme.141 Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit declined to imply a cause of action against a non-
fiduciary. 142
The Ninth Circuit also considered and rejected the possibility of a
cause of action for damages against a non-fiduciary under section
502(a)(3). 4 3 The court decided that permitting the recovery of damages
under section 502(a)(3) would render section 409(a)'s damage provision
superfluous and would thus violate a fundamental canon of statutory
construction. 4 However, the court did recognize the potential availa-
bility of equitable relief, including the imposition of a constructive
trust. 145
Three years later in Useden v. Acker, 146 the Eleventh Circuit agreed
with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that sections 409(a) and 502(a) do
not impose liability on non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate in a
fiduciary's breach. 147 However, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit's rationale because of the Supreme Court's opinion in Fire-
stone . 48 The Eleventh Circuit recognized that by incorporating trust-
law principles in its remedy, the Firestone court tempered its restrictive
139. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 871-72.
140. Id. at 872.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 873. See supra note 59 for the text of section 503(a)(3).
144. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873. See supra note 51 for the text of section 409(a).
145. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 874.
146. 947 F.2d 1563 (1 1th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3843 (U.S. June 7, 1993) (No. 91-
1944).
147. Id. at 1580, 1582. The court did not consider § 502(I)'s enactment or its legislative history.
148. Id. at 1580-81.
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opinion in Russell.14 9 Consequently, the Useden court interpreted
ERISA as "a tailored law of trusts" that draws on traditional trust-law
principles. 150 The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that a particular
trust-law principle should be incorporated into ERISA only if the stat-
ute's text suggests that the principle was not deliberately omitted from
the statute."'
The court examined ERISA's text to determine if the drafters might
have inadvertently failed to include a section providing for non-fiduciary
liability.'52 The court noted that Congress carefully tailored the reme-
dial provisions of section 502(a) and deliberately authorized courts to
provide appropriate equitable relief without restricting the types of de-
fendants in sections 502(a)(3) and 502(a)(5).' 3 The court also recog-
nized that Congress expressly mentioned third parties in other parts of
ERISA, but said nothing about non-fiduciary liability for monetary dam-
ages. "'54 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit declined to impose liability for
money damages on non-fiduciaries who knowingly participated in the fi-
duciary's breach because it found that Congress had not accidentally
omitted a section providing for non-fiduciary liability for damages.55
III. MERTENS v HEWITT ASSOCIATES
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates'56 the Supreme Court resolved the dis-
pute among the circuit courts. The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
decision 57 and held that a non-fiduciary who knowingly participates in a
breach of a fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA is not liable for the plan's
losses resulting from the breach. 58 The majority opinion, written by
149. Id.
150. Useden, 947 F.2d at 1581.
151. Id. Specifically, the court formulated the guiding principle that "a court should only incor-
porate a given trust law principle if the statute's text negates an inference that the principle was
omitted deliberately from the statute." Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Useden, 947 F.2d at 1581-82.
155. Id. at 1582. The Eleventh Circuit noted that courts could not infer that the lawmakers'
silence on nonfiduciary liability was inadvertent "in an area where they had already said so much out
loud." Id.
156. 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
157. 948 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1991).
158. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2065, 2072. Because the parties had focused on what forms of relief
are available, the Court decided the case solely on that question. Id. at 2067-68. The Court based its
holding on that narrow question, even though it was not clear that a remediable wrong had been
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Justice Scalia, 59 concluded that when Congress drafted ERISA's reme-
dial scheme, it had carefully omitted the common law's joint and several
liability for non-fiduciaries who knowingly participated in a fiduciary
breach."6 The Court explained that Congress omitted joint and several
liability in order to strike a balance between ERISA's primary goal of
protecting employees' 61 and the secondary goal of controlling pension
costs. 162 Consequently, the Court did not attempt to adjust the balance
struck by Congress. 163
In Mertens, the petitioners, participants in the Kaiser Steel Retirement
Plan,"6 sued Hewitt Associates, the plan's actuaries, for acts and omis-
sions that caused the plan to be underfunded, caused the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation to terminate the plan, and made the participants
lose a substantial portion of their pensions. 65  The petitioners sought
alleged. Id. at 2067. Additionally, the respondents, Hewitt Associates, had expressly disclaimed
reliance on the argument that the wrong alleged was legally remediable. Id.
159. Justice Scalia was joined in the opinion by Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas. Id. at 2065.
160. Id. at 2072.
161. See supra notes 4-5, 20-22, 117 and accompanying text.
162. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2072.
163. Id.
164. The Kaiser plan was an ERISA-qualified plan. Id. at 2065.
165. Mertens, 948 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1991). Early in 1980, the Kaiser Steel Corporation
restructured its business operations, virtually eliminating its steel-making operations. Id. at 609. As
a result, many employees who were plan participants retired early. Id. Due to the significant in-
crease in the number of participants taking early retirement, the plan's funding costs increased sub-
stantially. Id.
Hewitt Associates had developed actuarial assumptions for the plan based on Kaiser's corporate
structure prior to the restructuring. Id. After the restructuring, Hewitt did not change the actuarial
assumptions underlying the plan, rather, it delegated to Kaiser the responsibility for changing the
assumptions. Id. Hewitt delegated the responsibility because Hewitt was also providing actuarial
services to Kaiser. Id. Hewitt did not disclose its relationship with Kaiser and the potential conflict
of interest to the plan's administrators because it did not want to jeopardize its lucrative professional
relationship with Kaiser. Id
If the actuarial assumptions had been changed to properly reflect the restructuring, Kaiser would
have been required to make substantially higher contributions to the plan. Id. The plan was left
severely underfunded because the actuarial assumptions were not changed. Id. The Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation determined that the plan was severely underfunded and terminated the plan
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1322. Id. As a result, plan participants only received the benefits guaran-
teed by ERISA, which were substantially less than the benefits due under Kaiser's plan. Id. For
example, petitioner Mertens' monthly pension was reduced from $2,016.00 to $521.00. Id. The
petitioners brought suit on their own behalf and on behalf of the class of former Kaiser employees
who participated in the plan.
The Court accepted the petitioners' allegations as true because the District Court for the Northern
District of California had dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id.
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monetary damages as "other appropriate equitable relief" under section
502(a)(3).166 The petitioners argued that the language of section
502(1)167 enacted by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
supports the availability of monetary damages under section 502(a)(3).1'68
The petitioners observed that section 502(0(1) requires the Secretary
of Labor to assess a civil penalty equal to twenty percent of the "applica-
ble recovery amount" against a fiduciary who breaches or against any
other person who knowingly participated in the breach.' 69 The "applica-
ble recovery amount" is defined in section 502(/)(2) as either the amount
of a settlement agreement or of a judgment against a fiduciary or a non-
fiduciary who knowingly participated in a fiduciary's breach. 170  The
judgment used in section 502(l)(2) to compute the penalty is the judg-
ment obtained by the Secretary of Labor under section 502(a)(2) or
(a)(5). 171
The petitioners argued that sections 502(l)(1) and (2) are clearly based
on the assumption that judgments for damages always could be obtained
against fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries. 172 If judgments could not be ob-
tained, the twenty percent penalty would have no basis. 17  Section
502(l)(2) incorporates the statutory authorization of judgments for dam-
ages by reference to sections 502(a)(2) and (a)(5). The clear inference
from section 502(1)(2) is that sections 502(a)(2) and (a)(5) authorize suits
to recover plan losses from non-fiduciaries. 174
166. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2067. The petitioners' original complaint stated three causes of ac-
tion: "breach of professional duties to the plan" under ERISA, transactions as a party in interest in
violation of ERISA, and professional malpractice under California state law. Mertens, 948 F.2d at
609. The petitioners subsequently alleged that their first cause of action actually stated three claims
under ERISA: breach of fiduciary duty, knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty, and
non-fiduciary breach of actuarial duties. Id. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the typical plaintiff's claims. The Court granted certiorari on the question "whether ERISA
authorizes suits for money damages against non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduci-
ary's breach of fiduciary duty." Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2066.
167. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
168. Brief for Petitioner at 13-18, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993) (No. 91-
1671). Both the United States and the American Association of Retired Persons filed briefs as amici
curiae in support of the participants' argument.
169. Id at 14. See also supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
170. Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, Mertens (No. 91-1671). See also supra notes 56-58 and accom-
panying text.
171. Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, Mertens (No. 91-1671). See also supra notes 55-57 and accom-
panying text.
172. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Mertens (No. 91-1671).
173. Id
174. Id. The petitioners argued that both sections 502(a)(2) and (a)(5) authorize suits for losses
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The petitioners contended that participants and beneficiaries must be
able to sue non-fiduciaries for losses under section 502(a)(3) because the
Secretary of Labor may do so under section 502(a)(5). 175 Sections
502(a)(3) and (a)(5) provide the same remedies. 176 The relevant language
in sections 502(a)(3) and (a)(5) is identical. 177 The primary distinction
between the sections is that section 502(a)(3) authorizes participants and
beneficiaries to sue under both ERISA and the terms of a specific plan,
whereas section 502(a)(5) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to sue only
under ERISA. 178 The petitioners argued, therefore, that non-fiduciaries
must be liable under both sections 502(a)(3) and (a)(5).1 79
The petitioners also argued that section 502(l)(3)(B) also clearly indi-
cates that the phrase "appropriate equitable relief' in sections 502(a)(3)
and (a)(5) includes the recovery of "all losses to the plan."1 80 Under
section 502(l)(3)(B), the Secretary of Labor may waive or reduce the civil
penalty, if the penalty would prevent the fiduciary or non-fiduciary from
restoring "all losses to the plan without severe financial hardship." 81
The petitioners argued that the waiver provision would be meaningless if
non-fiduciaries were not liable for "all losses to the plan." '182
The Court rejected the petitioners' arguments. Initially, the Court ob-
served that non-fiduciaries are not liable for plan losses under section
against non-fiduciaries. Id. The petitioner contended that because the Secretary of Labor could
bring suits against non-fiduciaries under section 502(a)(2), participants also must be able to bring
suits. Id. However, as the Court noted, section 502(a)(2) refers to suits brought under section 409,
which is expressly limited to fiduciaries. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2067-68. See infra note 179 and
accompanying text. The stronger argument is that because section 502(a)(2) is expressly limited to
suits against fiduciaries, non-fiduciary liability must be found in section 502(a)(5).
175. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Mertens (No. 91-1671). The reason for excluding participants and
beneficiaries from section 502(l) is obvious: the government, not private citizens, should be assessing
a penalty payable to the government.
176. See supra notes 59, 61 and accompanying text.
177. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Mertens (No. 91-1671). See also supra notes 59, 61 and accom-
panying text.
178. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
179. Brief for Petitioners at 15-17, Mertens (No. 91-1671).
180. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Mertens (No. 91-1671).
181. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
182. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Mertens (No. 91-1671). Moreover, the Conference Report on
section 502(1) echoed the earlier legislative history's mandate to the courts to formulate legal and
equitable remedies to protect the interests of participants and beneficiaries. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 433, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3036. See also supra note 117
and accompanying text. For earlier legislative history, see supra notes 5, 20-22 and accompanying
text.
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502(a)(2) because the section is expressly limited to fiduciaries. 8 3 The
Court then discussed whether the petitioners could recover plan losses as
"appropriate equitable relief' under section 502(a)(3).' 84
The Court focused on whether section 502(a)(3)'s provision for "ap-
propriate equitable relief' includes compensatory damages-monetary
relief for plan losses resulting from the fiduciary's alleged breach.I" The
Court noted that damages are typically not an equitable remedy.' 6 The
Court recognized that it had previously construed language contained in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 similar to the language con-
tained in section 502(a)(3) to preclude "compensatory or punitive dam-
ages."' 87 However, the Court recognized the possibility of reading the
phrase "equitable relief" as either "equitable remedies" or as "whatever
relief a common law court of equity could provide."'' 88 Because of the
different possible interpretations and because ERISA is rooted in the
common law of trusts, 18 9 the Court continued to consider the relief avail-
able in a court of equity at common law.190 The Court recognized that
courts of equity traditionally had exclusive jurisdiction over virtually all
actions for breach of trust and could "establish purely legal rights and
grant legal remedies." 19'
The Court concluded, however, that Congress intended the phrase
"equitable relief' in section 502(a)(3) to mean the relief typically avail-
able in equity, such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, rather
than the relief available in a court of equity. 92 The Court reasoned that
if "equitable relief" meant any relief available in a court of equity, the
relief would not be limited at all, and the modifier "equitable" would be
superfluous. 1 93 The Court also observed that interpreting "equitable re-
183. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2066-67. See supra note 174.
184. Id at 2067.
185. Id. at 2068.
186. Id
187. Id (quoting United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1872 (1992)). Prior to the 1991
amendments, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided for "any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate." Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 39, 87-90 and accompanying text.
190. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2068-70.
191. Id at 2068 (quoting 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 181, at 257 (5th ed. 1941)).
192. Id. at 2069.
193. Id In a footnote, the Court rejected the petitioners' argument, which the dissent accepted,
that the relief is limited because punitive damages are not available. Id. at 2069 n.7. The Court
argued that punitive damages were not a major issue when ERISA was enacted in 1974 and that the
petitioners and the dissenters were "projecting current attitudes upon the helpless past." Id.
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lief" as the relief available for a breach of trust at common law would
give the phrase different meanings in different sections of ERISA.1 94
Consequently, the Court concluded that the "equitable relief" available
under section 502(a)(3) is limited to the relief typically available in
equity. 195
The Court then addressed the petitioners' argument based on section
502(l).196 The Court stated that the "equitable relief' available under
section 502(a)(5) includes "restitution of i-gotten plan assets or profits,"
which provides an "applicable recovery amount" for calculating the civil
penalty. 197 The Court then observed that even if non-fiduciaries are not
liable at all for knowing participation in a fiduciary's breach, the liability
of co-fiduciaries makes some "other person" than the fiduciary liable
under section 502(l)(1)0B). 198 Consequently, the Court found that sec-
tion 502(l) could have meaning without any form of non-fiduciary
liability.1 99
The Court's final analysis addressed the petitioners' argument that
non-fiduciaries should be liable in order to further ERISA's basic pur-
pose.2" The Court concluded that even though ERISA may preempt
actions previously available under state law, "vague notions of a statute's
'basic purpose'" are not sufficient to overcome specific textual lan-
guage.20 1 The Court stated that Congress had carefully considered the
competing interests of protecting employees and containing pension costs
and had balanced those interests in ERISA's enforcement provisions.20 2
194. Id. at 2069-70. The Court noted the distinction between "equitable" and "remedial" relief
in § 409(a) and the distinction between "equitable" and "legal" relief in §§ 502(g)(2)(E) (the enforce-
ment provisions of Title I), 104(a)(5)(C) (the filing and furnishing information provisions of Title I),
4003(e)(1) (the operations provisions for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation), and 4301(a)(1)
(the civil actions provisions for the PBGC). IM
195. Id. at 2070.
196. Id. at 2070-72.
197. Id. at 2071. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
198. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2071. See supra notes 50 and 53 and accompanying text.
199. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2071. The Court cited the Secretary of Labor's initial interpretation
of § 502(l) for additional support. Id. The Court observed that "the proposed regulation imple-
menting § 502(l), to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2560.5021-1, states that when a court awards 'equita-
ble relief'-as opposed to 'monetary damages'-a § 502(/) penalty will be assessed only if the award
involves the transfer to the plan of money or property." Id. (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 25,288, 25,289 n.9
(1990)).
200. Id.
201. Id. The Court observed that this is particularly true in the context of "an enormously
complex and detailed statute" such as ERISA. Id.
202. Id. at 2072.
1993]
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Consequently, the Court refused to "attempt to adjust the balance...
that the text adopted by Congress has struck. 20 3
The Court reached the wrong result in Mertens. As Justice White's
dissent highlights,2" the decision is incorrect in both its legal analysis
and its policy conclusions. The petitioners sought a compensatory mone-
tary award which would have traditionally been available in a court of
equity against a non-fiduciary who knowingly participated in a fiduci-
ary's breach.20 5 In construing ERISA, courts are guided by "principles
of trust law."'20 6 Yet, as Justice White observed, the Court in Mertens
stripped ERISA trust beneficiaries of a traditional common-law remedy
and reached the anomalous result of affording employees less protection
under ERISA than under the common law.207
The Court misconstrued the phrase "equitable relief" in sections
502(a)(3) and (a)(5). Regardless of the Court's distinction between "eq-
uitable remedies" and "whatever relief a common law court of equity
could provide,"20 the Court should have recognized the availability of a
make-whole compensatory monetary award because such a remedy was a
traditional "equitable remedy" available in a court of equity.20 9 Justice
White's dissent accurately observed that the Court could have recognized
the availability of the make-whole remedy and still distinguished between
"equitable remedies" and the relief generally available in a court of eq-
uity by precluding the enforcement of penalties and the award of punitive
damages.210 Moreover, the Court's attempt to give the modifier "equita-
ble" a consistent interpretation throughout the statute2" is far more
strained than simply reading the phrase "appropriate equitable relief" as
203. Id
204. Id. Justice White's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Stevens. Id
205. Id. (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
206. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2072 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989)). See supra notes 22, 87-90 and accompanying text.
207. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2072.
208. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
209. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2074 (White, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 26-33, 204 and
accompanying text.
210. Id. at 2076 (White, J., dissenting). The majority replied by stating that punitive damages
were not an issue when ERISA was enacted. Id. at 2069 n.7. See supra note 193 and accompanying
text. However, such a distinction is no more of an imposition of present attitudes on the "helpless
past" than the majority's assumption that Congress weighed non-fiduciary liability against the need
to contain the costs of plan administration when drafting ERISA. See supra notes 7, 202-03 and
accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
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a general description of the remedies avilable in equity under trust law.212
Because courts are guided by the principles of trust law, the Court
should have followed these principles and recognized the availability of a
make-whole compensatory monetary award.213
The Court also failed to recognize the significance of section 502(l).
Section 502(l)(1) provides that a civil penalty may be assessed against
"any other person" who knowingly participates in a fiduciary breach.214
The petitioners had inferred from the penalty provision that some "other
person," in other words, a non-fiduciary, must necessarily be liable or
else the section would be superfluous. 215 The Court eliminated the neces-
sity of inferring non-fiduciary liability from section 502(l) because the
Court reasoned that a co-fiduciary is an "other person" as described in
section 502(l)(1).216 However, the Court misunderstood co-fiduciary lia-
bility. Section 405 describes the three situations where a fiduciary (the
co-fiduciary in section 405) is liable for another fiduciary's breach of fidu-
ciary responsibility.21 7 In fact, section 405(a)(1) specifically describes
one of the situations as the knowing participation in another fiduciary's
breach.2"' The co-fiduciary is liable under section 409(a) for knowingly
participating in the other fiduciary's breach.21 9 Consequently, the co-fi-
duciary is liable as a fiduciary and may have a penalty assessed under
section 502(l)(1)(A) for a breach of fiduciary liability.220 Because the co-
fiduciary is liable under section 502(l)(1)(A), either section 502(l)(1)(B)
212. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2075 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent also appropriately recog-
nized that the statutory provisions cited by the majority in establishing the significance of the modi-
fier "equitable," see supra note 194, do not have an analogue in the common law of trusts. Mertens,
113 S. Ct. at 2075 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent correctly noted that, consequently, Congress
reasonably would have referred to both equitable and legal remedies to direct the courts to fashion
whatever form of relief is most appropriate, whether equitable or legal. Id.
The dissent also properly observed that the inferences drawn from Congress' varying phraseology
are of minimal certainty. Id. at 2075 n.4. Just as Congress used the modifiers "legal" and "equita-
ble" to describe the relief available under certain sections, it used the modifiers "legal" and "reme-
dial" to describe the relief available under section 409(a). Id. "Remedial" typically means
"intended as a remedy" and "relief" is a synonym for "remedy," yet Congress still used the redun-
dant phrase "remedial relief" in section 409(a). Id. Such imprecision certainly undermines the
strength of the inferences drawn from word choice.
213. See supra notes 26-33, 205 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 169-82 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 50 and 53 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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and portions of sections 502(l)(2) and (3) are superfluous or some "other
person," in other words, a non-fiduciary, is liable under section
502(l)(1)(B). The Court should have recognized the non-fiduciary liabil-
ity underlying section 502(l) rather than rendering superfluous a care-
fully integrated civil penalty section.221
The Court also improperly discounted the significance of ERISA's un-
derlying policy. The purpose behind ERISA's enactment can hardly be
characterized as "vague." Section l(b) specifically states that ERISA's
purpose is "to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries... by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and access to the Federal courts." '222 The legislative history is
replete with references to ERISA's purpose and the 93rd Congress' in-
tent.223 Previously the Supreme Court had regularly recognized both
ERISA's purpose and the federal courts' role in developing federal com-
mon law to fill the statutory interstices.224 Still, the Court in Mertens
disregarded ERISA's fundamental purpose and accepted a strained inter-
pretation of the statute that has left plan participants and beneficiaries
with less protection than the common law provided.
IV. PROPOSAL
On June 11, 1993, Labor Secretary Robert Reich wrote a letter to Sen-
ate Labor and Human Resources Committee Chairman Edward Ken-
nedy (D-Massachusetts) stating that the Mertens decision threatens the
Department of Labor's enforcement efforts, including the litigation pend-
ing against the Executive Life Insurance Company. 225 Secretary Reich
221. The Court's argument that the Secretary of Labor's proposed regulation supports its posi-
tion, see supra note 199, is also flawed. The proposed regulation simply states that when a court
awards equitable relief, a section 502(l) penalty will be assessed only if the award transfers money or
property to the plan. Despite the Court's contention, the regulation's rationale involves pragmatics,
not the distinction between legal and equitable remedies. A twenty percent penalty may be com-
puted easily using the award of money or the property's fair market value as a basis. Computing a
twenty percent penalty using an injunction or a writ of mandamus as a basis is considerably more
difficult.
222. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988). See supra notes 4-5, 20-22 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 4, 20-22 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
225. Meegan M. Reilly, Senate Labor Committee Approves Reconciliation Amendment, TAX
NoTES, June 21, 1993, at 1653. In the 1980s, many employers cancelled their company pension
plans and replaced them with insurance annuities issued by the Executive Life Insurance Company.
Junk bonds provided over sixty percent of Executive Life's funding. In 1991, Executive Life was
forced into bankruptcy. Consequently, thousands of pensioners who held Executive Life annuities
lost substantial amounts of their pensions. Many of these pensioners have filed suits against the
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explained that the Mertens decision may result in the dismissal of many
pending cases involving serious breaches of fiduciary duty if the defend-
ant non-fiduciaries can characterize the relief sought as compensation for
losses rather than restitution of profits or transferred assets.226
On June 16, 1993, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources responded to the Department of Labor's concerns by approving a
budget reconciliation amendment introduced by Senator Howard Met-
zenbaum (D-Ohio).227 The amendment would overrule the Mertens deci-
sion and make non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduciary
breach liable to the plan and plan participants.22 Under the amend-
ment, the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries
could sue for equitable relief, including monetary damages.229  The
amendment would expressly preclude punitive damages as a remedy.230
Opponents of the amendment convinced Senate leaders to remove the
amendment from the budget reconciliation bill.23' Instead, the amend-
ment will be considered later this year through bipartisan legislation.232
Opponents of the amendment have argued that an amendment revers-
ing Mertens will increase the cost of administering employee benefit plans
because both fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries would raise their fees to
cover the additional risk of liability.233 The opponents argue that the
increased administrative costs will inhibit pension plan formation and
cause some plans to terminate.234
The amendment's opponents correctly argue that the additional liabil-
fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries who invested plan funds in Executive Life despite knowing that Exec-
utive Life relied heavily on junk bonds. Because of the Mertens decision, courts will dismiss many of
these suits leaving a lot of pensioners without a pension and without a remedy. See 139 CONG. REC.
S8530-01 (daily ed. July 1, 1993) (statements of Sens. Kennedy and Dodd).
226. Id. Secretary Reich also observed that the Mertens decision eliminated the only remedy
available to plan participants who lost tax benefits because a fiduciary ignored a plan provision
requiring notice of IRS rollover requirements, or who lost wages due to discriminatory firings to
prevent pension benefits from vesting. Id.
227. Id.; Labor Letter, A Special News Report on People And Their Jobs in Offices, Fields, and
Factories, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Labor Letter].
228. M. Reilly, supra note 225.
229. Id.
230. Id. See supra notes 193, 210 and accompanying text.
231. Labor Letter, supra note 227. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and others had criticized the
inclusion of the amendment in the budget reconciliation bill. M. Reilly, supra note 225.
232. 139 CONG. REc. S8530-01 (daily ed. July 1, 1993).
233. M. Reilly, supra note 225. The National Employee Benefits Institute, the ERISA Industry
Committee, and Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Connecticut) are among the amendment's opponents
who have raised these arguments. Id.
234. Id.
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ity exposure will increase administrative costs because fiduciaries and
non-fiduciaries will need to cover the additional exposure through addi-
tional liability insurance or self-insurance. However, the inferences op-
ponents draw from the administrative cost increases are not persuasive.
Although the cost of administering plans will increase, the majority of
the plan's increased cost will be passed on incrementally to the pension-
ers.235 Consequently, the extent to which the amendment will inhibit the
formation of new pension plans or cause existing plans to terminate is
probably overstated by the amendment's opponents.236
More significantly, two important policies support making non-fiduci-
235. The argument that pension plan costs can be passed on to pensioners without significantly
inhibiting the formation of new plans or drastically increasing the number of plans terminating is
straightforward. Assume that pensions are a normal good, in other words, as price increases, de-
mand decreases. Assume that demand is slightly inelastic, in other words, the decrease in the pen-
sioners' demand for pensions is less than the increase in the pensions' price. Also assume that supply
is slightly elastic, in other words, the decrease in the quantity of pensions provided is greater than the
increase in the cost of pensions. Elementary economics teaches that under these conditions, the
majority of the increased cost of the pensions will be passed on to the pensioners.
If the pensioners are risk averse, the utility gained from the security of insurance will exceed the
costs of the insurance. Therefore, the pensioners will pay for the increased cost associated with
insurance by accepting a slight reduction in pension proceeds.
A simple expected value example demonstrates the inelasticity of demand because pensioners'
prefer insurance over the risk associated with no insurance. Assume that the value of the pension is
$100. Given that approximately one-fourth of the plans reviewed by the Secretary of Labor have
fiduciary violations and that many of those violations result in serious losses for the plan partici-
pants, see supra note 6 and accompanying text, assume that a 25 percent chance exists that a fiduci-
ary breach will result in a 75 percent reduction in the pension. See supra note 165 for an example of
a 75 percent loss. Also assume that insuring the pension plan against losses due to non-fiduciary
participation in the breach would cost 10 percent of the pension's value, so that in the example, the
insurance costs $10. The pensioners have two expected value equations.
E[U] = expected value of pension without insurance
= probability of breach [value of pension after breach]
+ probability of no breach [full value of pension]
= .25 [$25] + .75 [$100] = $81.25
E[U] = expected value of pension with insurance
= probability of receiving full pension after insurance
X [full value of pension less cost of insurance]
= 1.00 [$100 - $10] = 1.00 [$90] = $90.00
The rational, risk-averse pensioner would choose the higher expected value, E[U] = $90. Choosing
insurance makes sense for the average pensioner. The average pensioner would rather have the
security of a slightly lower, but insured, pension than the insecurity of a slightly higher, but unin-
sured, pension. In other words, the value of the peace of mind provided by purchasing insurance
exceeds the price of the insurance. Consequently, the majority of the increased costs associated with
insuring against a fiduciary breach would be passed on to the pensioners. As a result, pension plan
formation would not be dramatically inhibited, and few existing pension plans would be terminated.
236. See supra note 235.
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aries jointly and severally liable for plan losses resulting from knowing
participation in a fiduciary breach. First, making non-fiduciaries jointly
and severally liable furthers ERISA's basic purpose: protecting the inter-
ests of plan participants and beneficiaries in plan benefits.2 37 If non-fidu-
ciaries are not jointly and severally liable, many participants and
beneficiaries will have substantially reduced pensions due to the breach
and will be left without an adequate remedy.238 Such a result does not
protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. The only par-
ties who benefit from the result are non-fiduciaries who were enriched by
participating in a breach and are now enjoying their profits in the repose
of the Mertens decision. The common law would not have granted non-
fiduciaries who knowingly participated in a fiduciary breach any res-
pite.239 Affording plan participants and beneficiares less protection
under ERISA than the common law provided is anomalous at best in
light of ERISA's stated policy and legislative history.24
Second, making non-fiduciaries jointly and severally liable requires fi-
duciaries and non-fiduciaries to make good on the employers' promises:
pensions for retired employees and their beneficiaries. Making non-fidu-
caries jointly and severally liable may increase plan administration costs,
but these costs are only the costs reasonably associated with fulfilling the
promises made to the pensioners. Some employers have been able to
minimize plan administration costs by not obtaining insurance and, con-
sequently, to allocate to the pensioners the risk of loss due to breach.
These employers have successfully forced unsuspecting pensioners to
bear the risk of loss and, by effect, self-insure. The fact that some em-
ployers have shifted the risk of loss to unsuspecting pensioners in the past
does not mean that the employers should be allowed to continue to allo-
cate the risk of loss to the pensioners. Moreover, to continue allowing
237. See supra notes 4-5 and 19-21 and accompanying text. Although Justice Scalia minimizes
the significance of "vague notions of a statute's 'basic purpose'" in the Mertens majority opinion,
113 S. Ct. at 2071, section l(b) of ERISA plainly states that "[i]t is hereby declared to be the policy
of this chapter to protect... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their benefi-
ciaries ... by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts."
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988). In the Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Con-
gress further expressed the title's policy, which includes the desire "to increase the likelihood that
participants and beneficiaries under single-employer defined benefit pension plans will receive their
full benefits." 29 U.S.C. 1001(b)(c)(3) (1988).
238. See supra notes 4-5, 20-22, 125, 225-26 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of non-fiduciary liability
under the common law.
240. See supra notes 4-5 and 20-22 and accompanying text.
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the risk to be allocated to the pensioners is to continue allowing employ-
ers to break their promises of providing pensions to employees. Employ-
ees who work for years, relying on the employers' promises of a pension
should not be left without a remedy against those who knowingly partici-
pated in the acts or omissions that cost them their hard-earned pensions.
To the extent that eliminating non-fiduciary liability eliminates the only
make-whole remedy available to plan participants and beneficiaries, ER-
ISA's purpose and enforcement scheme are undermined.
The following suggested amendment, which parallels the common law
of trusts, would overrule Mertens and allow participants and beneficiaries
to obtain judgments for damages against non-fiduciaries who knowingly
participate in a fiduciary's breach. The proposal expressly allows partici-
pants and beneficiaries to bring suit on behalf of the plan to recover dam-
ages from non-fiduciaries who knowingly aid in the fiduciary's breach of
duty. The amendment provides the plan with the best possible opportu-
nity to be compensated for losses resulting from the breach by holding
non-fiduciaries jointly and severally liable with the fiduciary. Section 409
of ERISA could be amended by adding subsection (c):
(c) Any person who knowingly aids a fiduciary with respect to a plan
in the breach of any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed
upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make
good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each fiduciary
breach and to restore to the plan any profits that such person made
through use of assets of the plan and other relief the court may deem
appropriate.
Congress should enact the proposed amendment to protect the inter-
ests of plan participants and beneficiaries in receiving their benefits.
CONCLUSION
Whether a non-fiduciary who knowingly participates in a fiduciary
breach should be liable for damages under ERISA is an issue that di-
rectly affects the everyday lives of many pension plan participants and
beneficiaries. If a plan is substantially undercompensated after a fiduci-
ary's breach because the non-fiduciaries who knowingly participated in
the breach are not liable, retirees will not receive their pensions, employ-
ees will not be covered adequately by medical insurance, and surviving
spouses will not receive their life insurance proceeds. Congress should
enact a suitable amendment that clearly holds non-fiduciaries liable to
[Vol. 71:773
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protect plan participants and beneficiaries who have been left even more
vulnerable by the Supreme Court's decision in Mertens.
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